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Aid, accountability and institution
building in Ethiopia: the self-limiting
nature of technocratic aid
Berhanu Abegaz*
Department of Economics, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA
Forty billion dollars of ODA over the past two decades has reduced
destitution in post-socialist and post-conflict Ethiopia. It has also
boosted the technocratic capacity of exclusionary state institutions,
while doubly enfeebling the fledgling private sector and independent
political and civic organisations. This aid–institution paradox is a pro-
duct of an alignment of donor–recipient strategic interests. The five
major donors pursued geopolitical and poverty reduction objectives;
and the narrowly based ruling elite sought total capture of the state,
ownership of the development agenda and use of pro-poor growth to
leverage large aid inflows and to seek domestic political legitimacy.
By coupling poverty reduction with adequate space for inclusive mar-
ket, civic and political engagement, a farsighted coalition of donors
could have complemented capacity building with the promotion of
state resilience. Scaled-up aid can still be delivered, as in Eastern
Europe, conditional on meaningful mutual accountability and the rule
of law.
Keywords: aid; accountability; institution building; state resilience;
Ethiopia
An aid–institutions paradox
Development is ultimately about freedom from want and freedom from fear.
The cornerstones of freedom and shared economic growth are capability,
opportunity and accountability. The first two are ideally synchronised by the
third in a political order that embraces a capable state, mutually binding rule of
law and inclusive governance. Well-designed and executed official development
aid (ODA) complements domestic efforts in building up bureaucratic capacity in
a manner that legitimises its authority in the eyes of all citizens.
This paper examines the effectiveness, besides boosting long-term growth and
poverty reduction, of ODA in fostering broad-based state and business institu-
tions in post-socialist Ethiopia between 1991 and 2014. Through a comparative
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analysis of the record on donor–recipient relations on what donors call ‘improved
service delivery, empowerment, and accountability’, it seeks to identify where
public-sector reforms advanced the narrow interests of the two official partners
and where the general interest was served by the strengthening of widely
supported public institutions.
More specifically we critically examine the mutual accommodation between
the developmental state proclaimed by the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) and
the public-institution reform agenda of its top-five development partners (DPs),
who contribute some two-thirds of official aid. We do this by scrutinising the
professed objectives and actual practices of three multilateral donors (the World
Bank, the EU and the African Development Bank) and two bilateral donors (the
UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the US Agency for
International Development (USAID)). We will also examine how the GOE
reacted to donor pressure in managing its relationship with its major DPs.
Generous pro-poor aid to Africa, in addition to supporting patrimonial con-
sumption and a lower tax effort, has suffered moral hazard for heavily commit-
ted donors by militating against the project of building legitimate, transparent
and accountable public institutions.1 The European Commission characterises
this puzzle as follows.
Ethiopia is challenging EU’s paradigm of democratic governance sustaining eco-
nomic growth by successfully adopting macro-economic and development best
practices with EU support, while reducing the scope for a Civil Society voice on
governance and human rights, against EU advocacy.2
This ‘aid-institutions paradox,’ whereby aid aimed at institution building ends
up providing perverse incentives for governments to invest less in domestically
accountable public institutions, raises two questions: what explains the strong
preference of the ruling party for supporting poverty reduction but not inclusive
state and non-state institutions? And what explains the revealed preference of its
five major development partners for building up the technocratic capacity of a
state that is manifestly captured by a narrowly-based ruling group?
Our working hypothesis, then, is as follows. The promise of time-bound,
subnationally tailored and harmonised official development aid to serve a cat-
alytic role in building up capable and inclusive public institutions in post-Derg
Ethiopia has proven rather fanciful. Where the interests of donor and recipient
are fully aligned – as in the areas poverty reduction, country ownership of the
development agenda and regional political stability – a strong incentive exists
for a self-enforcing partnership. Where there is a clash of interests between
donor and recipient, as has been the case with legitimising inclusion of all
fundamental stakeholders in the areas of party politics, policy deliberation and a
competitive market economy, donors wilfully blink, despite their strident rheto-
ric about the commitment to expand the ever-contested civic, political and eco-
nomic space.
This paper contributes to the literature on the aid–institutions nexus in two
notable ways. First, to our knowledge, it is the first systematic attempt to make
sense of the interplay between donor interests and the bewildering institutional
architecture of the Ethiopian political economy. Second, it confirms the widely
held view that aid rarely buys structural reform if such reform goes against the
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grain of donor and recipient interests. Politically conditioned aid which threatens
the recipient’s hold on state power will be resisted, and successfully so in this
case, in resource-poor countries where donor geostrategic interest is compelling
enough to allow the recipient to deliver only on poverty reduction.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. A general theoretical framework
for thinking about the centrality of effective institutions in supporting pro-poor
growth and political accountability is provided in the next section. This is fol-
lowed by a review of the levels and modalities of ODA, the nature of institu-
tional capture by the political class, and how well the congruence between the
fundamental interests of the GOE and those of its biggest DPs has hamstrung
aid-funded institution building in overly narrow technocratic dimensions. We
conclude with a summary of the arguments.
Theoretical and methodological considerations
Assessing the impact of aid on institutional effectiveness, in terms of both effi-
ciency and inclusiveness, poses a number of challenges for political-economic
analysis. The tasks include operationalising institutional robustness and quality,
disaggregating the impact of aid from that of domestic resources, identifying the
interests of donors and recipients, and employing the right metrics to gauge out-
comes. We take up each consideration, albeit briefly.
Of the three pillars of a modern political order (a capable and autonomous
state, rule of law that is anchored in societal norms and binding on the power-
ful, and an acceptable degree of accountability of state and business elites to
citizens), Ethiopia barely meets the first criterion. A robust state is clearly one
that is capable of defending its international borders, managing distributional
conflict fairly and effectively, and delivering basic public services. Such a state
also boasts a government that is considered legitimate by a broad cross-section
of society.3
How much a given state deviates from robustness has to be established on a
case-by-case basis since universal measures of state fragility take us only so far.
Even where fragility is discernible, the most efficient and feasible mode of aid
delivery is not always clear: should donors provide aid that temporally priori-
tises technocratic state building over democracy building or insist on a simulta-
neous nurturing of both? In this regard Ethiopian exceptionalism as a country
with a pedigreed and resilient non-colonial state provides an intriguing case
study.
A long agency chain mediates the effectiveness of aid in diffusing knowl-
edge and relaxing the binding constraints of long-term finance. To maximise
pass-through and full implementation of aid-funded programmes, the centrality
of efficient public-sector institutions cannot be overestimated.4 Given the inter-
governmental nature of ODA, the inclusiveness and flexibility of institutions
matter greatly. Some donors choose to build capacity and upgrade the quality of
policies. Others choose just to work with the status quo, or even to bypass it
altogether by outsourcing to non-state organisations.
Evaluating the impact of inter-governmental aid on institution building is fur-
ther bedevilled by methodological complications. One involves disentangling
the impacts of the domestic from the foreign when both monies and policies are
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tightly coordinated. Another entails controlling for all relevant variables other
than official aid that affect institution building. Comparing the programmes of
different donors in the same country, the method we adopt in this paper,
mitigates the problem of attribution since country characteristics are the same
for all donors.5 However, heterogeneity in donor behaviour has been dented
since big donors harmonised their aid programmes in Ethiopia, especially after
2002, and the various internationally comparable indices of governance quality
lack adequate time-series depth. The case study approach we employ here,
despite its limitations with respect to generalisability, is well suited to the
question at hand. It allows for a contextualised analysis of actor incentives and
behaviour.
We will, therefore, follow a straightforward procedure in structuring our
reading of the evidence. First, we will provide the context for the evolution of
state institutions, the rule of law and accountability in the past three decades or
so. Then we take a brief look at economic performance in terms of growth rates,
poverty reduction and inequality, without making a distinction between the
source of funds – domestic or foreign. Using a battery of internationally
comparable indicators of poverty and institutional development, we examine
whether increased aid flows have contributed to the emergence of capable, mer-
itocratic and inclusive public institutions.
It may be useful at the outset to pin down the typology of aid modalities that
link incentives with practice. Let us rule out two options which are least
applicable to Ethiopia today. If donors care solely about geopolitics but the
recipient regime is secure enough to care about both democracy and poverty
reduction, then aid will be doubly effective (aid to India or South Africa come
to mind). The other end of the spectrum is the case where donors care about
trade and investment but the recipient cares only about its own political survival.
In this case mutual self-interest preserves both poverty and tyranny (a case most
applicable to resource-rich kleptocracies).
The distinct tracks of the Ethiopian aid-reform envelope can then be reduced
to just three:
(1) Unabashedly apolitical aid. Donors care about trade and investment
access along with pragmatic support for poverty reduction (to promote
political stability) but the recipient regime cares about its own survival
plus poverty reduction (which has the virtues of being donor-financed
and legitimising). In this case poverty may be reduced, while repressive
politics endures or even intensifies, thereby accelerating state fragility.
This fits a charitable reading of Chinese aid to Ethiopia which, at least,
cannot be accused of hypocrisy.
(2) Poverty reduction trumps human rights. Donors care about both democ-
racy and poverty reduction, but the recipient cares only about its own
survival and poverty reduction. In this case, reflecting perhaps the widely
held view that democracy is impractical in the poorest countries, donors
pragmatically choose to prioritise short-term poverty reduction over
oppression reduction. This fits well the current Western model of aid for
Ethiopia.
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(3) Respect for human rights (ultimately) trumps poverty reduction. Donors
care about both democracy building and poverty reduction, but the
recipient cares about its own political longevity and poverty reduction. In
this case donors choose to privilege basic freedoms and the rule of law
over short-term poverty reduction. Allowing enough political space for
the emergence of these pro-poor coalitions, which would enhance
employment opportunities and business formation, is likely to have supe-
rior growth, distributional and accountability outcomes. A version of this
option is a two-pronged and simultaneous promotion of political and
economic development.
State-building and the emergence of an étatist regime
Ethiopia is an African country of 95 million with unusual features and myriad
contradictions. It has a resilient civilisation-state but has not managed to transition
fully into a modern nation-state. It is multi-ethnic (the biggest four ethnolinguistic
groups accounting for over three-quarters of the population) and bi-religious
(two-thirds being Christian and one-third Muslim). It is a mineral-poor and food-
insecure but rich in arable land, water, and abundant but capital-intensive hydro-
electric and geothermal resources. It enjoys a strategic location in the Horn of
Africa – a ‘bad’ neighbourhood but also close to major sea routes. Its chronically
aid-dependent governments have had a history of policy assertiveness in dealing
with donors. Finally, its current rulers are repressive but savvy and geostrategi-
cally valuable enough to captivate narrowly self-interested donors.
The evolution of Ethiopian living standards since 1950 is depicted in Figures
1 and 2. One striking observation stands out: Ethiopia is not just unbelievably
poor (and equally so with a Gini Index of 0.30) but lacks a robust growth engine.
The slow but steady gain in real per capita income in the 1960s was lost in the
subsequent three decades. The highest real per capita income, attained in 1969,
was restored only in 2008. The lack of a diverse economic base is reflected in
the high correlation between commodity prices and aid-funded investment, and
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Figure 1. Growth of real GDP for Ethiopia, 1950–2011 (in 2005 PPP$; output-based;
log scale).
Source: Penn World Tables 8.0, http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/.
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the rate of GDP growth. The recent rise in economic growth is driven by demand
expansion fuelled largely by public investment, which makes it quite prone to
balance-of-payments crises.6 Furthermore, exclusionary economic and political
institutions appear to have the joint effect of enhancing the country’s vulnerabil-
ity to recurrent political shocks, as shown by the patterns of Policy IV scores
since 1946 (Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Real GDP per person, and real capital stock per worker for Ethiopia, 1960–2011
(in 2005 PPP$; national accounts).
Notes: RGPP = real GDP per worker (bottom line). RKPW = real capital stock per worker
(top line).
Source: Penn World Tables 8.0, http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/.
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Figure 3. Ethiopia: authority trends, 1946–2013.
Notes: Vertical axis is Polity IV scores. Turning Points: 1974 Revolution, 1991 overthrow
of Derg; 2000 split within EPRDF, and 2005 highly polarising parliamentary elections.
Source: Adapted from Systemic Peace database, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/
eti2.htm.
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The first half of the period under review was bookended by major wars. The
civil war, spearheaded for two decades by the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front
(EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), culminated in the
replacement of the garrison-socialist regime (known as ‘Derg’) in May 1991 by
a TPLF-led coalition of ethnic-based political organisations under the name of
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).
During this honeymoon period the EPRDF presided over a post-conflict and
post-socialist double transition (Table 1). Black Africa’s largest national army
was summarily disbanded and the top echelon of the civil service was replaced
by loyalists. Predictably other Derg state institutions were preserved (most nota-
bly, the state bureaucracy’s answerability to party commissars, nationalised
urban and rural lands and the commanding heights of the economy, and a party-
state control apparatus down to the neighbourhood or Kebele level). Tariffs were
reduced and restrictions on private sector investment were either lifted or signifi-
cantly reduced. Prices were progressively decontrolled but inflation remained
low. A limited programme of privatisation of state enterprises (largely benefit-
ting political allies) was undertaken. To the delight of donor and citizen alike, a
number of independent civic organisations (including a relatively free press) and
opposition parties were permitted during this transition period.7 In the meantime
the province of Eritrea seceded and a major war ensued over the division of the
spoils and ill-defined borders.
While 1995 witnessed the introduction of a radically new constitution, the
high hopes for meaningful power sharing, much less a peaceful power transfer
as a result of free and fair elections, ended in 2005. Ethiopia today boasts a
government led by a ruling party propounding the ideology of ‘revolutionary–
democratic’ developmentalism. Decoded, this means the vanguard party has the
obligation to forge a direct ‘coalition with the masses’ to represent (and control)
them. Some have charitably reinterpreted this form of crony capitalism as an
African developmental neo-patrimonialism – a system of bureaucratic but also
personalised rule with a leadership committed to pro-poor growth by centrally
mobilising and investing economic rent, including aid money.8
Another hallmark of the regime is the melding of statism with political ethnic-
ity as foundational principles. The new constitutional order has reinforced struc-
tural fragility in the polity by emphasising the supremacy of primordial group
rights and introducing two competing lines of authority – party and state.9 In a
nutshell, this ‘holding together’ and top-down model of federalism has four dis-
tinctive features: (1) autonomous status was thrust upon ethnically delimited
regional states to be run by the new class of ethnic politicians; (2) each major
subnational group was intended to be dominant in one, and only one, regional
state regardless of population size; (3) there is a mismatch between the top-down
territorial assignment of homeland for each ethnic group and the reality of
high geographic mobility and inter-ethnic marriage; and (4) the hegemony of a
single party reduces the power of federal units while also providing the glue
to hold them together in the absence of viable democratic institutions.10 The
institutionalisation of atavistic ethno-nationalism has introduced, as in Malaysia
and apartheid South Africa, the notion of ‘dual citizenship’, which undermines
inter-group trust for building a robust pan-Ethiopian state.11
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Accountability and the rule of law: citizen rights and popular legitimacy
Given the absence of effective domestic constraints on the exercise of state
power, a strong positive correlation is discernible between the degree of power
consolidation by the ruling elite and the willingness to violate the constitutional
rights of citizens with impunity. Gross and persistent human rights violations,
which underlie Ethiopia’s consistently dismal international rankings, are the stuff
of numerous well-researched reports.12
Recent examples highlighted by such organisations include the arrest of 5000
Oromo for their actual or suspected political opposition to the government;13 the
forcible eviction of 8000 ethnic Amhara residents from Benishangul-Gumuz in
2013 on the heels of another eviction from Gura Farda in SNNP;14 the passage
of two draconian pieces of legislation – the charities and societies proclamation
and the anti-terrorism proclamation – which place sharp restrictions on or crimi-
nalisation of constitutionally protected political and civic activities;15 the dis-
placement of a number of agro-pastoral communities to make way for
hydroelectric and irrigation projects or for mega-land leases in the Omo and
Gambella regions;16 and the large and growing number of political prisoners
whose ranks are augmented by the delisting of multi-ethnic opposition political
parties, the latest being the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (Andnet).
Internationally comparative evidence on the GOE’s capability, policy and
performance comes from disparate sources. It is summarised in Table 2. Despite
a strong economic performance, reflected in a 25% gain on the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) over the past decade, the country still ranks 173 out of 186
countries in the world on the overall HDI metric. With respect to qualitative
Table 2. Ethiopia: trends in respect for citizens’ rights, 2004–14.
Index and Country Rank
Index/
Rank,
2004–05
Index/
Rank,
2011–14
Change,
2005–14
Ranking scale
(best–worst)
Human Development Index
(HDI):
• HDI
• Rank
0.316 0.396 0.080 1.0 – 0.0
177 173 -4 1–186
Transparency International: CPI
• Rank
0.23 0.33 0.10 1.0–0.0
114 113 -1 1–174
Freedom House: (total)
• Political Rights
• Civil Liberties
(partly free) (not free) (worse) (free/partly/
not)
5 6 -1 1–7
5 6 -1 1–7
Foreign Policy: Failed State Index
• Rank
91.1 97.9 -8.8 20.0–114.9
30 17 -13 177–1
Notes: The Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranked Ethiopia 32 out of the 52 countries in 2014. CPI =
corruption perception index.
Sources: UNDP, “Human Development Index,” http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi;
Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/; Freedom
House, https://freedomhouse.org/; Foreign Policy, “Failed States Index,” http://foreignpolicy.com/; and Ibrahim
Foundation, “Ibrahim Index of African Governance,” http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/.
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evidence on voice and participatory decision making, Ethiopia ranks low on
perception of individual corruption (113 out 176), with low and worsening
Freedom House scores on rights (6 out of 7 on the scale). For what it is worth,
Foreign Policy’s state fragility index is high and deteriorating, with Ethiopia
having fallen among the worst 17 countries out of 177. When the various
dimensions of the rule of law index are parsed, the country ranks towards the
bottom on all measures except corruption and criminal justice.
The preponderance of the multidimensional evidence also points to the rever-
sal of liberalisation towards an Ethio-centric private-sector-led development. The
GOE likes to rationalise aid- and public-investment-driven economic growth,
two-thirds of which originated in the public sector, as adequate compensation
for the denial of accountable governance by invoking the success of the étatist
East Asian model of development.17 It views state institutions as instruments of
party politics rather than as instruments for demand-led public service provision,
or as partners with a robust private economic sector and independently organ-
ised interest groups.
Alignment of donor and recipient interests
Donors seem to have grudgingly jettisoned their much-touted support for com-
petitive market institutions and subnational ownership of aid programmes. To
appreciate the latter’s implicit cost–benefit calculus, we need to take a closer
look at aid modality in practice.
In addition to the UN system, five DPs have had deep engagement with the
GOE: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Commission (EC),
the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group,
DFID and USAID. These five DPs provided nearly two-thirds of the ODA
received during the period. Over the past 10 years the GOE has presented
donors with three Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Updated every
three years with annual progress reports, the PRSPs contain an assessment of
poverty and of the associated macroeconomic, structural and social programmes
along with identified external financing. Ethiopia’s PRSPs are consistently
praised for being country-owned, pro-poor and collaboratively developed with
external partners. Despite the close collaboration with donors (most notably the
EU and IDA), the five-year development plans embody the vision of the ruling
party emanating from the Prime Minister’s Office. Domestic stakeholders are
typically invited only to comment on drafts.18
The most comprehensive and best articulated of the GOE development plans
were issued in the 2000s.19 The pillars of SDPRP (2001–04) included pro-poor
growth (rural and urban), human development (primarilysocial services), and
resilience for the poor. PASDEP (2005–10) focused on rural development, job
creation, expanding public infrastructure, and improving tax collection and the
public finance system as well. GTP (2010–15) focuses on productivity-driven
growth (commercial agriculture, expanded infrastructure and industrial develop-
ment), enhancing the quality of social services, building a capable developmen-
talist state and restoring macroeconomic stability in the face of the alarming
pace of monetisation of the domestic debt. The GOE has recently scaled up its
ambitions by undertaking tens of billions of dollars of investments in roads,
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railways, power and agro-processing industrial zones which are likely to diver-
sify its export basket and boost higher paying jobs. This may well mean less
dependence on foreign aid in the near future.
A discernible division of labour is evident between multilateral donors and
bilateral donors. Multilaterals have a comparative advantage in supporting physi-
cal infrastructure and better economic governance (civil service, fiscal manage-
ment, training and decentralisation). Bilaterals have a competitive edge in the
social sectors (education, health, water and food security) along with a sec-
ondary interest in issues pertaining to political governance (mainly in the form
of civic education and gender equity). The level of aid and the focus of donors
are reported in Figure 4 and Table 3.
AfDB started operations in Ethiopia in 1975 and has to date committed US
$3 billion to finance over 90 operations. It is particularly strong in the areas of
multi-donor basic service delivery and energy-related infrastructure.20
IDA is Ethiopia’s largest soft lender and a leader in aid harmonisation and
coordination. It has provided aid in the form of soft loans and grants (compris-
ing one-third) to the tune of $10 billion since 1950. Some 70% of this was pro-
vided after 1991, and 20% of it has been devoted to public-sector institution
building.21 Overall IDA programmes have focused on growth, human develop-
ment (social spending and economic governance) and food security. The current
country partnership programme has two pillars: fostering competitiveness (via
macro-stability, gains in productivity, expanded infrastructure and regional inte-
gration); and enhancing resilience (through delivery of social services and a bet-
ter approach to social protection and risk management.22 The bridge between
the two is taken to be good technocratic governance (public sector managerial
efficiency and transparency) and state-capacity building (by deepening policy
dialogue, fostering the use of country systems and increasing the predictability
of budget support).
EU official aid to Ethiopia, collectively the largest, has come through two
channels.23 The first is the EC, mainly the European Development Fund (EDF).
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EDF has been active since 1975. Like IDA, EDF relies on periodic replenish-
ments by member states rather than on predictably regular budgetary allocations.
These monies are supplemented by loans from the European Investment Bank
(directed mainly at public utilities) and together account for 40% of total EU aid
to Ethiopia. Following the Cotonou agreement of 2000 politically neutral entitle-
ments under the Lomé Convention gave way to performance-based, politically
conditioned and sectorally selective aid. The scaled-up aid also had to come pri-
marily in the form of general budget support.24 EC support, however, shows a
marked preference for the developmental end of the development–democracy
nexus.25
The aid relationship between Ethiopia and the UK is a longstanding one.
DFID has in recent years ramped up support, making Ethiopia the largest recipi-
ent of British aid in Africa, if not in the world, today. British aid, which totalled
$1 billion during 2005–11, is expected to rise by $0.8 billion in 2012–17.26
DFID is well-known for its eagerness to pool its resources with other donors,
especially for promoting sustainable livelihoods, for its reticence about the
domestic political implications of its aid, and for a penchant for impact evalua-
tion of its programmes.27
The alliance between the USA and Ethiopia was strong between 1950 and
1975. The USA not only resumed both military and economic aid in 1991 but
accelerated these as the fight against terrorism made Ethiopia a reliable political
ally in the unstable Horn of Africa. The latest country-development cooperation
strategy supports US foreign policy priorities, ostensibly mindful of the needs,
constraints and opportunities in Ethiopia.28
One mantra of the donor-owned country strategy papers is aligning donor
objectives and modalities with those of the Ethiopian government. The Donors’
Assistance Group (DAG) was established in 2000, and joint and harmonised
programmes have become the hallmark of the aid regime ever since. Ethiopia’s
report card on the Paris Principles in 2008 shows a grade of B on ownership
and mutual accountability. However, alignment, harmonisation, and managing-
for-results garnered only a grade of C. DAG has long recognised that public
sector reform is essential for rectifying serious capacity deficits and a dysfunc-
tional managerial culture, all the while maintaining an assiduous silence about
the tenets of the underlying political order.29
Aside from the dismal record on human, civil and political rights noted ear-
lier, Ethiopia’s business climate for domestic investors has remained sub-par in
many important respects, and the volume of aid inflow is largely insensitive to
it (Figure 5). The various indicators, absolute indices and relative intercountry
rankings alike, point to mostly worsening trends.
While government effectiveness has improved measurably since 2005, voice
and accountability, and political stability and non-violence have fallen from
unenviable initial levels. This is confirmed by IDA’s country performance on
institutional accountability (CPIA) ratings, which show a steep deterioration in
the public management score but a significant gain in the economic management
score (Figure 6).
It is also worth noting here that, when it comes to petty bureaucratic corrup-
tion, Ethiopia has a lower level of corruption than its African peers in basic ser-
vices. However, it is high and rising in other sectors such as construction, land,
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mining, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.30 What is often overlooked,
however, is that endemic political corruption is reaching kleptocratic propor-
tions, with all the corrosive consequences for trust in public institutions. One
disturbing manifestation of economic misgovernance is the systematic conver-
sion of public assets into party assets,31 and the former’s use in political patron-
age (especially through a brazen unlocking of economic wealth embedded in
urban real estate and commercialisable rural land) by politically linked groups.
Institutions favouring redistributive rent-seeking are supplanting institutions of
wealth creation.
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Figure 6. CPIA ratings for Ethiopia.
Notes: IRAI = IDA resource allocation index. CPIA = country policy and institutional
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Source: World Bank, African Development Indicators, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/africa-development-indicators; and World Bank, World Development Indica-
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Grand corruption at the level of the highest policy circles is also evident in
other ways. According to a recent joint study by the AfDB and Global Financial
Integrity,32 illicit financial outflows from Ethiopia (mainly resulting from trade
mispricing – under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports) were
estimated at $19 billion (the African total being $1.3 trillion) during 1980–2009.
If true, this is equivalent to half the ODA inflows of the past two decades.
And yet, aid is demonstrably contributing to poverty reduction. So donors
have faced a dilemma: provide (domestically) apolitical aid with a focus on eco-
nomic liberalisation and public capacity building or insist on linking aid to robust
political and market openness, risking GOE push-back and possible disengage-
ment. This conundrum was brought to sharp relief following the 1998–2000
Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-election public outcry and government violence
of 2005. During 2002–05, donors were rapidly moving money to untied general
budget support (GBS), since prolonged suspension of aid was viewed as a threat
to the government’s targeted spending programme on basic services.
Case study: protection of basic services (PBS)
After jointly voicing their displeasure with the GOE actions, four of the five
DPs (USAID being the exception) chose to introduce tailor-made budget support
for Ethiopia, later renamed Protection of Basic Support (PBS). Actually support
for PBS is broader and includes the EC, Austria, Germany, Ireland (Irish Aid),
the Netherlands, DFID, Canada, AfDB and the World Bank (IDA).
The PBS vehicle is worth a closer look since it is emblematic of donor cre-
ativity (or evasiveness, to some) in grappling with the aid-institution paradox.
PBS was purportedly intended to punish federal officials for their embarrassing
political indiscretions by withdrawing permissive GBS from the federal authori-
ties. The PBS instrument was sold as an effective way of strengthening the
hands of de jure autonomous (but de facto captive) local governments which, at
least in terms of the theory of public finance, are closest to users or citizens.
Dependent on federal block grants to cover 80% of their expenditures, the
district-level administrations cared more about predictability and timeliness of
fund flows than about their sources – domestic or foreign. The money was to
provide predictable budgetary grants which only nominally had to go through
the federal fiscal plumbing. In other words, unlike GBS, PBS restricts the use of
donor-supplied funds to the district level (vertical restraint) and for pro-poor
programmes only (horizontal restraint).
As noted earlier, the country today has three effective levels of state struc-
ture: federal (national), killil (regional), and woreda (district). Woreda adminis-
trations (district-level units of the government with some 100,000 residents) are
constitutionally mandated to provide basic social services (security, education,
agriculture, water and health). Woreda Councils are also responsible for provid-
ing local oversight of those Kebele and local organisations involved in the
implementation of federal mandates, including reviewing and approving annual
development plans and budgets, and interfacing with citizens and community
organisations.
PBS is, therefore, a multi-sourced (pooled GOE and multi-donor funds),
multi-sector and multi-level block grant that provides fast-disbursing funds to
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implement mutually agreed programmes. Funds for basic services and for the
procurement of scarce health-related commodities comprise the bulk of the trust
funds which are overseen by IDA. They are funnelled through the federal
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) – the designated
managing agency responsible for planning, reporting and disbursing funds to
lower-level governments. MOFED transfers PBS funds down the chain of the
federal revenue-sharing mechanism (using a recently revised formula that is
based largely on need rather than efficiency) to some 800 Woreda bureaus of
finance. Smaller funds are channelled through a separate chain via sector
ministries to fund sector-specific projects or programmes.
PBS has gone through three phases: phase 1 (2006–09), phase 2 (2010–12),
and phase 3 (2013–17). The Basic Services Block Grant (Programme A) funds
the core social service expenditures and claimed $6 billion in the first two
phases, with another $6.2 planned for the third phase. The smaller Programme
B has three components: a local public financial management component to han-
dle the funds on the supply side; a citizen engagement (transparency and
accountability) component that provides budgetary information to the public,
solicits feedback (report cards from citizens and local community organisations)
and handles grievances on the demand side; and a donor audit component. Pro-
gramme B has been expanded in phase 3 with an allocation of $115 million.
Relying on such harmonised block grants and guided by certain core princi-
ples (additionality, sustainability, equity, social compact, independent evaluation
and the like), PBS concedes full country ownership to the GOE. This modality
is touted by proponents as a cure for the perennial problem of fungibility,
because the bulk of the funds is contributed by the GOE itself, and donors have
a lot of say in how all funds are utilised.33 Several arguments have been made
in favour of PBS being more effective than GBS or projectised aid: (1) PBS is
superior in terms of harmonisation and predictability; and (2) the major donors
have been able to contribute substantially to the decentralisation process, not just
in the form of improved public financial management, but by legitimising the
district-level authorities. PBS, in other words, works precisely because it relies
on the top-down system enforced by strong party discipline and traditional
patron–client relationships, rather than on a bottom-up democratic accountability
mechanism.
Counter-arguments abound against the PBS modality. First, it takes off the
table national-level donor leverage in the dialogue on macro-policy and gover-
nance in a country where the Prime Minister’s Office has complete control over
the policy agenda. By acceding to the wishes of a recipient which heavily dis-
counts the future, donor influence on inclusive governance, genuine decentralisa-
tion and even sector-level implementation has been undermined. Second, by
channelling most of the support through various types of budget support (global,
sectoral, targeted), donors have managed to ensure aid sustainability to fight
poverty while sacrificing promotion of good political governance and deeper
structural economic reforms. Third, PBS has increased the transaction costs of
monitoring and evaluation by opting for an elaborately expansive intergovern-
mental fiscal arrangement.34
The first evidence-based study on PBS uses survey data to assess the impact
of the programme in the areas of accountability and effectiveness in the delivery
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of social services at the subnational level.35 It finds indirect evidence that
increased hiring of health extension workers and teachers, whose salaries absorb
80% of the PBS funds, has produced significant, equitable and pro-poor health
and educational outputs and outcomes (rates of net enrolment, vaccination,
contraceptive use, etc) in a cost-efficient manner.
Using a principal–agent framework of accountability of service providers to
beneficiaries, the report infers from pilot opinion surveys that the indirect route
of accountability is discernible.36 The evidence for this is the recent introduction
of government- and donor-sponsored accountability mechanisms such as public
posting of budgets, the Ombudsman and citizen feedback.37
Hard options for smarter aid
The current aid model is in large part based on the idea that ODA buys pro-
poor policy reforms and also helps to build more capable public institutions.
This development-before-democracy strategy is presumed to pave the way for a
robust private sector and sustainably shared economic growth. In reality,
however, there is a weak correlation between bad political governance and high
economic inequality, and quality economic growth. This is so because
authoritarian regimes must necessarily place a high premium on loyalty and
exclusion rather than on meritocracy and more diffused power centres.38 Propo-
nents of PBS cannot credibly ignore the salience of power relations for enduring
aid effectiveness.
Are there credible alternatives to technocratic aid which would merit serious
consideration? The five biggest donors, should they wish to create a united front
for change by linking economic aid to a pro-poor and a progressively inclusive
political and economic environment, are left with two sequences of action.
One strategy is to leverage money and technical assistance to push for a
deliberate and steady dismantling of the EPRDF’s party-state in order to create a
level playing field for all fundamental stakeholders. This can be done by
employing time-bound political triggers that are based on internationally recog-
nised governance benchmarks, by invoking international treaties to which the
GOE has acceded, and by pushing to honour the myriad rights enshrined in the
Constitution. Interestingly, under intense pressure from international civil society
organisations, DFID has just announced plans to redirect all PBS funds to other
programmes. In response to criticism by the Inspection Panel of the mistreat-
ment of the Annuak people, the management of the World Bank has just
accepted the need to mitigate the risks arising from PBS-implicated coercive
villagisation and land grabs.39
If this strategy fails, aid will then have to be reduced progressively up to the
level required for humanitarian assistance – a course of action supported by
such notable prisoners of conscience as Eskinder Nega.40 Given our analysis of
the logic of the regime-affirming governance strategy for the recipient and the
primacy of geostrategic interests for donors, one can reasonably be sceptical of
such a prescription. This is even more the case, given the progressively declin-
ing dependence of GOE on donor financing of development projects.41 How-
ever, the major donors still enjoy substantial leverage in terms of finance,
market access and policy lock-in should they wish to collectively pursue their
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enlightened self-interest by minding the risks of myopic aid for the long-term
viability of the Ethiopian state and market economy alike.
Conclusion
The central contention of this paper is that self-interested and pro-poor aid to
Ethiopia has enhanced the technocratic capacity of public institutions while doing
little to bolster political legitimacy by widening space for non-state stakeholders.
We argued further that decentralisation is ultimately about the distribution of
power and the incentives facing local actors, not just about administrative control
or expediency. Given the difficulty of institutionalising effective domestic politi-
cal bootstraps for restraining power-holders, the habitual resort of donors solely
to technocratic approaches often underwrites long-term state de-building in con-
flict-prone countries. Donors wishing at least to do no institutional harm can and
must, therefore, take seriously the professed objective of coupling poverty
alleviation with inclusive and resilient institutions in Ethiopia.
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